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BREAKING THE SOVEREIGNTY BARRIER: THE
UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL COURT
Alex Ward*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In July 1998, representatives of 148 countries gathered
in Rome to draft a statute (Rome Statute) for the
International Criminal Court (ICC).' The Court had long

existed on the wish-list of the United Nations,

but

considerable disagreement had always dismantled any
Finally, after five years of
attempts for its realization
intense negotiation, the global community approached the
establishment of a judicial body with the ability to prosecute
criminals for the gravest breaches of international law.
The United States traditionally supported the principles
underlying the ICC,' and it had expressed its support publicly
4
for the Court on many occasions. Surprisingly, by the end of
the conference the United States found itself in the company
of a small group of renegade states rejecting the statute,
* Articles Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 41. J.D. candidate,
Santa Clara University School of Law; B.A., University of California, San Diego.
1. See Permanent War Crimes Court Approved, AP Online, July 18, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 6696642.
2. See Gerard E. O'Connor, The Pursuit of Justice and Accountability: Why
the United States Should Support the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 927, 948 (1999) (pointing to the failure of
the international community to seize the momentum created by the Tribunals).
3. See Bartram S. Brown, U.S. Objections to the Statute of the
InternationalCriminal Court: A Brief Response, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
855 (1999).
4. See Kenneth Roth, The Court the U.S. Doesn't Want, N.Y. REV. BOOKS,
Nov. 19, 1998, at 45.
5. See Jim Lobe, Rights-U.S.: Republicans Urge Clinton to Oppose ICC,
INTER PRESS SERV., July 23, 1998, available in 1998 WL 5988429. Virtually all
of Washington's traditional European and East Asian allies voted for the treaty,
while China, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Qatar, and Yemen voted against it. See id.
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while its closest military and political allies joined the vast
majority of nations in signing the instrument.6 The United
States denounced the statute as fundamentally flawed,
contrary to international law, and a serious infringement on
its ability to maintain peace and security around the world.7
Therefore it came as a surprise when on December 31, 2000,
President Bill Clinton reversed his policy and hesitantly
agreed to sign the treaty, thus handing the issue to the
Senate and a new administration.
This comment seeks to determine whether the United
States acts in its best interest in accepting the statute of the
ICC or conversely in opposing the establishment of the Court.
Part II examines the ancestry of the ICC,8 the role of the
United States in its development,9 and the legal issues that
shaped the debate at the Rome conference. ° In Part IV the
focus turns to an analysis of the legal arguments made by the
United States against the Court." Finally, Part V concludes
with a proposal 2 advocating that the United States supports
the statute and then briefly considers prospects for
ratification.
II. BACKGROUND
The first attempt to create an international criminal
court within the context of the United Nations occurred in
1954.'" The fact that almost fifty years passed before the
historic vote in Rome can be looked at in two ways. On the
one hand, it evidences the disagreement that plagued the
development of the Court over the years . A more revealing
angle, however, views the passage of the Rome Statute as
6. See id.
7. See generally Hearings on the Establishment of a Permanent
International Criminal Court Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
105th Cong. (July 23, 1998) [hereinafter ICC Hearings] (statement of David J.
Scheffer, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues and Head of the U.S.
Delegation to the U.N. Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of a
Permanent International Criminal Court), transcript available in 1998 WL
12762512; see also discussion infra Part II.D.
8. See discussion infra Part II.A.
9. See discussion infra Part II.C.
10. See discussion infra Part II.C-D.
11. See discussion infra Part IV.
12. See discussion infra Part V.
13. See 3 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
ENFORCEMENT 7-8 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1987).
14. See O'Connor, supra note 2.
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astonishing, considering the relative youth of the
international legal system. Indeed, not until 1945 were
individuals accepted as subjects of international law."
History of InternationalTribunals
Prior to World War II only domestic jurisdictions could
6
Although the League of
try individuals for war crimes.
Nations had drafted proposals for an international tribunal,
only one country ratified the plan before efforts stalled in the
face of political problems and the commencement of World
War II. In light of the atrocities committed by the Nazis, the
Allies quickly responded to renewed interest in an
8
On August 8, 1945, the
international criminal tribunal.
Allies formed the International Military Tribunal for the
9
prosecution of major war criminals in Nuremberg, and in
1946 a similar body, the International Military Tribunal for
the Far East, was established in Tokyo."
Despite some controversy over the inherent fairness of a
2
tribunal established by the victors of the war, a general
consensus exists that these courts laid down important
22
First, the tribunals
precedents for international law.
recognized that individuals could be held accountable for
23
violating duties imposed by customary international law.
This marked a shift from the traditional belief that only
states, as the primary actors in the international community,
could be the subjects of customary norms. While the subject
A.

15. See Henry T. King & Theodore C. Theofrastous, From Nuremberg to
Rome: A Step Backward for U.S. Foreign Policy, 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 47,

52 (1999). However, international law following Nuremberg witnessed a change
in thinking regarding the rights, obligations, and duties of the individual and
the state in the international context. See id.
16. See id.
17. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 13, at 9.
18. See O'Connor, supra note 2, at 939-40.
19. See id. at 940.
20. See id. at 940-41.
21. See id. at 941. But see King & Theofrastous, supra note 15, at 53

(suggesting that the actions of the United States at Nuremberg transcended
mere victor's justice).

22. See King & Theofrastous, supra note 15, at 53-54; O'Connor, supra note

2, at 943-44 (noting the Nuremberg principles have become general principles of
international law).
23. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 13, at 6 (noting that the basic form of
accountability was that of individual responsibility); O'Connor, supra note 2, at
941-42.

24. See King & Theofrastous, supra note 15, at 52 ("During pre-Nuremberg,
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matter of the tribunals was well-founded, this extension of
liability to individuals constituted a dramatic step.25
Furthermore, Articles VII and VIII of the Nuremberg charter
specifically rejected defenses based on state sovereignty
which domestic courts had used in the trials following World
War 1. 26 This opened up the possibility of prosecuting leaders
who claimed immunity under the acts of state doctrine, as
well as lower officials who claimed defenses based upon
superior orders. 7
The widespread popularity of these principles resulted in
their codification both in a U.N. General Assembly
resolution 28 and by the International Law Commission (ILC).29
Additionally, the tribunals served as a strong symbol of the
possibilities for an international court with universal
jurisdiction. ° However, the development of the Cold War
ultimately
stymied
the momentum
that
followed
Nuremberg,3 ' and almost fifty years would pass before
another attempt to create an international court was made."
Between 1945 and 1993 hundreds of events occurred that
might have justified the establishment of another ad hoc
tribunal, but serious efforts did not commence until the
humanitarian crisis in Yugoslavia.33 On May 25, 1993, the
U.N. Security Council used its Article VII powers to establish
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY). 34 This tribunal, seated in The Hague, has
been praised not only for its unbiased and international
character, but also for its fairly reputable record of obtaining
custody of defendants. " Of the ninety-eight persons indicted
the basic tenets of international law pertained only to states, as individuals
were not the proper subjects of international law.").
25. See O'Connor, supra note 2, at 942 (characterizing the tribunals as an
important advancement in the area of international law).
26. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 13, at 6.

27. See id.
28. See id. at 7.
29. See id.
30. See O'Connor, supra note 2, at 943-44.
31. See id. at 944.
32. This attempt resulted in the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY). See infra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
33. See King & Theofrastous, supra note 15, at 68 (citing genocidal acts by
the Japanese, Russians, and Cambodians, as well as massive fatalities in
Uganda, Indonesia, East Timor, El Salvador, and Argentina).
34. See O'Connor, supra note 2, at 945.
35. See id. at 947-48.
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by the court, it currently has thirty-nine in criminal
proceedings and has dropped charges against eighteen,
leaving twenty-seven accuseds still at large."
The following year, the Security Council formed the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to deal
with the humanitarian crisis left behind by years of brutal
tribal conflict." Like the ICTY, the charter of the Rwanda
Tribunal contains some language nearly identical to the
Nuremberg document concerning the accountability of
The Tribunal has rendered only eight
individuals.38
convictions as of the date of this comment, but has over forty
individuals currently in custody.3
Jurisdiction of the ICTY and ICTR is based upon
universality as conferred by the Security Council." Both
courts hold primacy over the domestic laws of their relative
geographic locations as well as over the governments of those
41
individuals involved with peacekeeping efforts.
The United States had an influential role in all four
tribunals, both as a member of the victorious alliance that
42
established the courts in Nuremberg and Tokyo and as a
member of the Security Council that established the bodies in
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.4 3 The United States had also
furnished financial and technical support to the two latest
tribunals" and has several prosecutors and judges involved in
2001)
18,
Apr.
Key Figures (last modified
36. See ICTY
<httpJ/www.un.org/icty/glance/keyfig-e.htm>. The remainder of indictees are
comprised of those who have been convicted, acquitted, or have died before the
commencement of proceedings. See id.
37. See O'Connor, supra note 2, at 946-47.
38. See Marcella David, Grotius Repudiate: The American Objections to the
International Criminal Court and the Commitment to InternationalLaw, 20
MICH. J. INT'L L. 337, 348 (referring to the courts as the progeny of Nuremberg).
39. See ICTR, Detention of Suspects and Imprisonment of Convicted Persons
(Feb. 2001) <http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISHI/factsheets/7.htm>.
40. See ICTY Key Figures,supra note 36; see also ICTR, supra note 39.
41. See Burden of Proof: Millennium 2001: Would an InternationalCriminal
Court Help or Hinder Pursuitof Global Justice? (CNN television broadcast, Jan.
2, 2000) [hereinafter Burden of Proof] (statements made by David J. Scheffer
admitting the primacy of the Tribunal's jurisdiction), transcript available at
<http://cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/ 0001/02/bp.00.html>.
42. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
43. See supra text accompanying notes 34, 37.
44. See David J. Scheffer, The International Criminal Court, Remarks
before the 6th Comm. of the 53d General Assembly, U.S. Department of State
(Oct. 21, 1998), transcript available at <http://www.state.gov/www/policyremarks/1998/981021_scheffericc.html>.
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their operation.4 5 This would seem to suggest that the United
States tacitly supported the founding principles of the courts.
B.

Why an InternationalCourt?
Serious interest in the establishment of an international
criminal court revived in the late 1980s.4 6 This is partly due
to the easing of Cold War tensions that had rendered the
United Nations divided and ineffective for many years." The
speed with which the Court developed reflected the inherent
limitations from which the status quo solutions to
international crime suffered.
Domestic prosecution of
international crimes could occur, but in reality most incidents
occurred within the territorial boundaries of states.48 The
government of the state, often the perpetrator, would never
bring criminals to justice.4 9 Under the international principle
of universal jurisdiction, other states could prosecute an
accused, although few had the political will," and
apprehending potential criminals remained a remote
possibility.5
Additionally, the prominent international solution, the ad
hoc tribunals, proved inadequate for many reasons. First, the
establishment of a tribunal was subject to political
consideration since it had come from the Security Council of
the United Nations.5 2 Despite the formation of the Yugoslav
and Rwandan courts, the Council exhibited a very poor
record.5 3 States demanded a solution that would not involve
inconsistency of implementation.5 4
Second, the tribunal
system was woefully inefficient. Critics viewed both the ICTY
and ICTR as virtual afterthoughts in that they had been

45. See generally ICTY Key Figures, supra note 36; see also ICTR, supra
note 39 (listing the names and nationalities of the court officials).
46. See David, supra note 38, at 353.
47. See id.
48. See King & Theofrastous, supra note 15, at 64 (citing the non-existence
of mechanisms to apprehend criminals).
49. See id. (referring to states which prefer anarchical systems of law).
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See David, supra note 38, at 350.
53. See id. at 351 ("The judicious use of the veto power held by the
permanent members has prevented the U.N. from effectively responding. ...").
54. See Burden of Proof, supra note 41 (quoting statements made by
Gabrielle Kirk McDonald that the ICC is needed to head-off international crime
before it begins).
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established following years of violence and bloodshed." The
gap in time between the formation of the ad hoc courts and
the arduous process of physically establishing the tribunal
constituted areas of serious concern, for it allowed violence to
6
continue and gave suspects the chance to flee the area.
Lastly, the tribunals proved economically inefficient because
of their need to procure facilities, staffing, and supplies in the
pertinent region.57
C. Developments Precedingthe Rome Conference
In 1989, the General Assembly passed a resolution
authorizing the ILC to study the possibility of an
international criminal court.58 After a favorable report from a
commission, the Assembly asked the ILC to begin drafting a
statute in 1992.'" In 1995, the General Assembly established
a preparatory committee (Prepcom) to help form a
consolidated text for review. ° Leading up to the Rome
Conference, the committee held six preparatory conferences
that involved both national representatives and nongovernmental organizations.6 '
During this time the United States seemed to overtly
bolster establishment efforts." President Clinton had made
supportive remarks on several occasions, 3 and Congress had
also expressed its approval of Prepcom's work. 4 Perhaps the
firmest evidence of the seriousness with which the United
States approached the issue came in 1997 with the
appointment of Professor David Scheffer to the newly-created
position of "Ambassador to War Crimes."6 From the start,
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See King & Theofrastous, supra note 15, at 65.
58. See Brown, supra note 3, at 857-58.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 858.
61. See id.
62. See James P. Rubin, U.S. Department of State: Office of the Spokesman
Press Statement (Apr. 2, 1998) <httpJ/secretary.state.gov/www/briefmgs/
statements/1998/ps980402.html> (reaffirming the president's continued
commitment to the Court); James B. Foley, U.S. Department of State: Office of
the Spokesman Press Statement (June 12, 1998) <http://secretary.state.gov/
www/briefmgs/statements/1998/ps980612a.html>.
63. See Roth, supra note 4 (observing that President Clinton had repeatedly
endorsed the Court).
64. See King & Theofrastous, supra note 15, at 77.
65. See Lawyer Sam's War, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 24, 1999, available in
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Scheffer, who headed the American delegation in Rome,
favored signing the ICC document,66 but his misgivings
coupled with the directives of hard-line leaders in
Washington left him with little room to maneuver on the key
issues of contention.67
Thus, in the months leading up to the Rome Conference,
the United States appeared to send mixed messages. In
February, Scheffer expressed his and the President's
commitment to the Court, but he also identified the
substantive and national interest concerns that most
preoccupied the delegation.68 First, Scheffer characterized the
ICC as a safety net which must buttress national prosecution
of international crimes. 9 Unlike the criminal tribunals in
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 7° the United States sought to base
the ICC on the principle of complementarity, which would
allow states the first option of investigating and prosecuting
international crimes committed by their citizens.7
This
emphasis on sovereignty set the overall tone for the American
approach.
Second, the United States foresaw the U.N. Security
Council as the key player in the operation of the Court.72
Scheffer believed that the Court should respect the
jurisdiction of the Council to address issues under its Article
VII power.73 Additionally, Scheffer argued that the Council
should refer cases directly to the Court as well as function as
the primary enforcement mechanism.74
Third, the United States cautiously regarded state
consent to jurisdiction. Although he only glanced over the
1999 WL 7362645.
66. See id.
67. See King & Theofrastous, supra note 15, at 79. In retrospect, an
important element of the U.S. position in Rome was apparently framed by
influential members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. See id.
68. See David J. Scheffer, An International Criminal Court: The Challenge
of Enforcing International Humanitarian Law, Address Before the Southern
California Working Group on the International Criminal Court (Feb. 26, 1998),
transcript available at <http'/www.state.gov/www/policy-remarks/1998/980226
schefferhumlaw.html>.
69. See id.
70. See ICTY Key Figures, supra note 36; see also ICTR, supra note 39.
71. See Scheffer, supra note 68.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.

20011

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

1131

issue, Scheffer implied that the power of the Security Council
and the strength of the complementarity principle would
effect the American stance on this point."6
Fourth, addressing the fear that the United States would
open itself to frivolous political attacks, Scheffer sought to
limit the power of the Court's prosecutor to independently
The United States delegation
commence investigations."
would limit the prosecutor to
that
proposal
a
clearly favored
cases referred by the Security Council or by the state party of
which the accused was a national. 8
Lastly, various other substantive and procedural issues
existed that posed problems, the most pressing of which were
the definitions of crimes and the procedures for amendment
of the treaty.79
Scheffer maintained rigid legal positions, despite the
overall conciliatory tone of the State Department and the
president. ° Meanwhile, Senator Jesse Helms, a pivotal actor
in the Senate, began to wage an all-out offensive against the
Court. Helms had two principle fears: first, denouncing any
surrender of national sovereignty to the United Nations by
the United States,8 ' and second, rejecting any court that
would have jurisdiction of American citizens over the express
objections of the United States. 2 Helms declared that any
treaty without a "clear U.S. veto. .. will be dead-on-arrival at
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,"83 and that "[t]hose
negotiators do not have any 'flexibility' [on the issue].""
A final element concerning the delegation's agenda
emerged shortly before the Conference began. The State
Department, while continuing to profess its support for the
Court, made a deviation from its more formalistic arguments
to emphasize the impact that the ICC might have upon the
76. See id. (claiming the need to maintain reservation on the issue and
continue examining the statute further).
77. See Scheffer, supra note 68.
78. See id.
79. These issues included dispute resolution, amendments, withdrawal
rights, and funding. See id.
80. See Rubin, supra note 62.
81. See Jesse Helms, Helms Declares U.N. Criminal Court "Dead-OnArrival" in Senate Without U.S. Veto, Mar. 26, 1998, available in 1998 WL
7322525.
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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foreign policy of the United States." Scheffer's statement
that the "creation of the Court will not take place in a
vacuum "86 sent two simultaneous messages.
First, it
reminded the world of the significant contributions the
United States made to world peace and security. Second, it
sent a message to foreign negotiators who might weaken
American interests by pushing idealistic and impractical
proposals.
D. Legal Hurdles at the Rome Convention
Due to the competing imperatives with which the U.S.
delegation entered the Rome Conference, the eventual
outcome was perhaps not surprising. Commentators
characterized the American strategy as disjointed and
inefficient." This incoherent approach manifested itself into
three broad categories: contributions that strengthened the
statute, those that weakened that statute, and the
irreconcilable points of contention upon which the United
States rejected the statute.
The U.S. delegation was at its best when it attempted to
infuse the rigid concepts of its legal system into the Court.
First, the United States succeeded in strengthening the
definitions of crimes, so that the definition of "crimes against
humanity" would apply to domestic human rights issues."
Second, the delegation stressed the inclusion of American
constitutional protections such as the presumption of
innocence and due process rights to protect the accused.8 9
Third, the United States strengthened the integrity of the
Court by calling for the inclusion of rules of procedure and
evidence. 6 Lastly, the U.S. delegation advocated for the
inclusion of the principle of complementarity into the
statute.9' This gave national governments the ability to avert
any prosecution as long as they had the structural capability
to investigate the matter and conduct a legitimate inquiry.92
Other contributions by the delegation ultimately
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See Rubin, supra note 62.
Foley, supra note 62.
See Brown, supra note 3, at 856-57.
See O'Connor, supra note 2, at 948.
See Scheffer, supra note 7.
See id.
See id.
See Brown, supra note 3, at 878.
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weakened the Court by limiting its sovereign power. Two
issues in particular stood out. First, on the definition of war
crimes, the United States feared that a conflict might arise
between what the ICC and the U.S. military considered a
lawful use of force." In particular, the rule of proportionality
in international law dictates that damage inflicted by
military attack may not be excessive relative to the strike's
objective.9 4 For a country like the United States, which relies
so heavily on bombing to achieve political objectives around
the world, this constituted a major concern. In the end, the
the
re-writing
in
succeeded
delegation
American
civilian
when
effect
into
come
only
to
proportionality rule
casualties are "clearly excessive" in relation to military
advantage.95 This language increases the likelihood that
cases based on proportionality will be difficult to raise under
the ICC.96 The delegation also weakened the Court in the
area of jurisdiction.
Although the United States disfavored many aspects of
the Court, three points in particular proved to be the primary
basis for rejection of the statute at the Rome Conference. All
three, not coincidentally, have profound implications on the
United States's ability to escape the jurisdiction of the ICC.
First, the ICC jurisdiction covered only the most serious
of international crimes: genocide,97 crimes against humanity,98
war crimes,99 and crimes of aggression.0 ° Although the first
three are well-grounded in international law,'0 ' consensus has
never existed on the definition of "aggression."' The United
States believed that the Security Council should preside over
crimes of aggression, as specified in Article 39 of the United

93. See Roth, supra note 4.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id. The effect of this and other concessions to the United States,
including a broader definition of military advantage, was to tip the balance
considerably against the ICC finding a violation of the rule of proportionality.
See id.
97. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 6, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
98. See id. art. 7.
99. See id. art. 8.
100. See id. art. 5, para. 2.
101. See Brown, supra note 3, at 865.
102. See id. at 868 ("The definition of aggression has long been a contentious
issue in international relations.").
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Nations charter. 113 However, the final draft of the ICC statute
contains the crime of aggression as a term that will come into
effect at a later date.' Because signatory states can amend
the treaty by a two-thirds vote,0 5 the United States feared
that it would be unable to control the potentially detrimental
definition.0 6 Additionally, it saw the inclusion of the term as
taking power away from the Security Council, where it enjoys
1
permanent member status. 07
The second point of contention concerned the power of the
ICC prosecutor. Negotiators struggled over the prosecutor's
ability to independently begin investigations free of
oversight.' 8
The American delegation pushed for
investigation only on referral by the Security Council or a
state party.0 9 This would ensure their ability to completely
control the scope of the Court when investigating or
prosecuting American citizens."0 Negotiators introduced two
compromise positions. The first established a three-judge
oversight committee to review all investigations by the
prosecutor."' The second compromise gave special power
given to the Security Council that enabled it to delay an
investigation for up to a year, provided that it received a
majority vote of the entire Council." 2 At the end of the year
the Council would reconsider the vote and conceivably move
to table the issue again." 3 These proposals, though deemed
satisfactory by several close allies, did not satisfy the U.S.
delegation."'
The final and most important issue for the delegation
was whether the Court had jurisdiction of non-party states
stemming from Article 12 of the statute. " 5 At one extreme,
some nations supported a manner of universal jurisdiction for
103. The Charter of the United Nations gives the Security Council the
authority to determine the existence of an act of aggression. See id. at 867.
104. See Rome Statute, supra note 97.
105. See David, supra note 38, at 355.
106. See O'Connor, supra note 2, at 956-97.
107. See Roth, supra note 4.
108. See id.
109. See ICC Hearings,supra note 7.
110. See Roth, supra note 4.
111. See id. (referring to this as the Argentine-German proposal).
112. See O'Connor, supra note 2, at 965.
113. See Rome Statute, supra note 97, art. 16.
114. See David, supra note 38, at 355-56.
115. See Roth, supra note 4 (referring to it as the "most divisive issue
delegates faced").
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the Court covering all states regardless of their ratification
status."' They reasoned that because states could already
prosecute individuals for these international crimes,
universal jurisdiction was appropriate." 7 The United States,
however, pointed out that creating international obligations
for a state not a party to a treaty ran counter to fundamental
principles of international law."8 Furthermore, the United
States argued that from a practical standpoint, the process of
signing and then ratifying the statute could take years or
A compromise proposal
might never happen at all." 9
materialized that would only grant the ICC jurisdiction if one
of four governments involved had ratified the statute: the
government of accused, the government of the victim, the
government where the crime occurred, or the government
that apprehended the accused. 2 °
The United States took a hard-line stance on the issue
and demanded that the Court have jurisdiction only if the
government of the accused had consented through
ratification. 2 ' Because this would allow the United States to
shield itself from jurisdiction by not ratifying the statute, any
investigation of a U.S. citizen would have to pass through the
Security Council, a remote prospect at best. 22 In hopes of
appeasing the United States, negotiators proposed another
compromise which would grant the Court jurisdiction if either
the government of the accused or the government of the
2
country where the crime had been committed consented. '
This compromise, though proposed with good intentions,
appeared to backfire on the negotiators.'24 The United States
departed the conference without signing the treaty, leaving
the Court with significantly weaker jurisdiction than it

116.
117.
118.
119.

See
See
See
See

id. (asserting that this was the German position).
id.
ICC Hearings,supra note 7 (statement of David J. Scheffer).
David J. Scheffer, The United States and the InternationalCriminal

Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 12 (1999).

120. See Roth, supra note 4. The South Korean delegation offered this
proposal.
121. See id.; see also ICC Hearings, supra note 7. A subsequent counterproposal would have bound the referring party to investigation by the Court,
but this was also seen as too limiting.
122. See Roth, supra note 4.
123. See id.
124. See id.
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conceivably should have retained.'
Finally, the U.S. delegation took exception to the
concurrent issue of opting out of the Court's jurisdiction.'2 6
The United States had originally proposed a ten-year opt-out
provision for war crimes to allow it to assess the effect of the
Court upon its foreign affairs."' Instead, the finalized statute
contained a seven-year opt-out provision available only to
states that ratified the treaty.'
This twist acted as an
incentive for states to sign onto the treaty now rather than
later."9 Coupled with the impending loss on the issue of
Article 12, however, the United States denounced the
provision.' 0 It argued that a state that committed war crimes
could opt-out of the Court's jurisdiction for seven years but at
the same time a non-party could come under the Court's
jurisdiction under Article 12.1"
Two days before the final vote, Ambassador Scheffer
issued a statement announcing the extreme likelihood that
the United States would vote against the statute.' 3 In light
of the many efforts the United States had made to protect
itself from the jurisdiction of the Court, many questioned the
sincerity of American efforts to establish the Court. 133
E.

PoliticalHurdles at the Rome Conference
The crux of the dilemma for the delegation at Rome was
that it accepted the ICC in principle, but as Senator Helms
commanded, it refused to budge on the issue of sovereignty.'
Although negotiators implemented safeguards to lessen the
prospects of U.S. forces coming into the reach of the Court,
125. See id. (referring to the concessions as "the worst of both worlds").
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

ICC Hearings, supra note 7.
id.
Brown, supra note 3, at 886-87.
Roth, supra note 4 (suggesting that this provision was ingenious).
ICC Hearings,supra note 7.
id.
David J. Scheffer, Status of Negotiations on the Establishment of an

International

Criminal

Court,

Statement

Before

the

U.N.

Diplomatic

Conference on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (July 15,
1998) transcript available at <http://www.state.gov/www/policy-remarks/1998/

980715_scheffericc.html>.
133. See Diane F. Orentlicher, U.S. Cheats Justice in Opposing World Order,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2459221 (stating that the

United States has already gone a long way to alienate its closest allies).
134. See A World Court for Criminals, THE ECONOMIST,
available in 1999 WL 7364825.
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American delegates feared the worst-case scenario. For
example, the statute integrated the principle of
complementarity, a major tenet of the American agenda, and
further strengthened it with the oversight of a judicial panel
to decrease the threat of politically motivated claims.' In the
event this body sustained a referral, a state could appeal the
decision as well.'36 However, the delegation would accept
7
nothing short of the extreme of an outright veto.
Furthermore, the Americans seemed to resent anyone
who questioned its sovereign decisions on foreign policy in the
first place.'38 As Scheffer stated, "Complementarity is not a
complete answer, to the extent that it involves compelling
states (particularly those not yet party to the treaty) to
investigate the legality of humanitarian interventions or
peacekeeping operations that they already regard as valid
39
official actions to enforce international law."' In essence, the
United States refused to accept the statute as long as it was
bound by the statute.
F. The Outcome
On July 17, 1998, participating states adopted the
statute by a landslide majority: 120 in favor, 7 opposed, and
21 abstaining. 4 ° Although the official vote was unrecorded
(at the request of the United States),' the opposition
consisted of the United States, Israel, Iraq, China, Libya,
Qatar, and Yemen.' Paradoxically, fourteen NATO members
signed the statute,"' several of whom remain the closest allies
of the United States on military and peacekeeping fronts. To
date, twenty-nine countries have ratified the statute,"'
including two major Western European powers."' France
amended its constitution and ratified the statute on June 8,
135. See Brown, supra note 3, at 880-81.
136. See id.
137. See Roth, supra note 4.
138. See Scheffer, supra note 119, at 19.
139. Id.
140. See Permanent War Crimes Court Approved, supra note 1.
141. See David, supra note 38, at 354.
142. See Lobe, supra note 5.
143. See id.
144. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Ratification
Status (last modified Apr. 30, 2001) <http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/
status.htm>.
145. See id.
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2000, followed by Germany, which ratified it on December 11,
2000.146 Once sixty nations have ratified the statute, the ICC
will exist in an official form.
G.

The Aftermath
Upon the return of the delegation from Rome, and amid
harsh criticism from the world press, the State Department
continued to frame the Court as an impossibility in light of
the current global structure.'4 7 Placing legal and political
issues hand in hand, Scheffer stated, "We could not bargain
away our security or our faith in basic principles of
international law. '8 Appearing before the Senate, he
reiterated the principle legal conflicts concerning the Court's
prosecutor, the jurisdiction of non-party states, and the optout provision. 4 9 He stated that the Court could hold profound
implications for U.S. peacekeeping efforts and could also
subject the United States to politically motivated attacks
even if it did not ratify the treaty.150
In response to Scheffer's remarks, several senators
expressed not only their relief over the rejection of the
statute," but further condemned the Court, calling it "a
monster that must be slain.""2 Furthermore, some call the
Court patently unconstitutional because it would subject
citizens to judicial power without the fundamental
protections of the Constitution."3
In the following year, the United States weighed its
options. On the one hand it continued to participate in the
post-conference Prepcom meetings,"4 but simultaneously the
United States considered its ability to pressure its allies"' on
the issue and began to renegotiate its Status of Forces
agreements."' The legal and political debate resurfaced late
in December 2000 as the final deadline for signing the ICC
146. See France Amends Constitution to Ratify Creation of World Criminal
Court, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, June 28, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2629160.
147. See ICC Hearings,supra note 7.
148. Scheffer, supra note 119, at 17.
149. See ICC Hearings,supra note 7.
150. See id.
151. See ICC Hearings, supra note 7 (statement of Senator Jesse Helms).
152. Id. (statement of Senator Rod Grams).
153. See id. (statements of Senator John Ashcroft).
154. See Scheffer, supra note 119, at 21.
155. See Orentlicher, supra note 133.
156. See id.
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statute approached. In a surprising move, President Clinton
authorized Scheffer to sign the statute on December 31, 2000,
the last day of eligibility. As the United States is now a
signatory state, the debate turns to the prospects for
ratification by the Senate, a process required for any such
international treaty.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
The United States can take three stances with regard to
the ICC. First, it can support the Court and gain more
influence through active participation. Second, it can ignore
the Court to the best of its ability and maneuver within the
status quo. Third, it can actively oppose the Court. In light
of the objections raised by the United States, the second
stance seems particularly impractical and therefore unlikely.
If and when sixty nations ratify the statute, the United States
will have to deal with the matter in one way or another.
Therefore, this comment seeks to address the problem of
whether the United States should ratify the statute for the
International Criminal Court. However, a determinative subissue is how the United States can strike a balance between
its interests and those of the international community as a
whole. In other words, can the United States reconcile its
substantive objections and concerns over sovereignty with its
desire to support the basic goals and principles upon which
the Court rests?
IV. ANALYSIS
American participation in the ICC carries particular
importance to the international community. First and most
7
obvious, it will effect the operation of the Court." Although
the ICC could subsist without the participation of the United
States, few would deny that its participation would serve as a
large benefit, both symbolically and economically."' Second,
the decision will affect both the perception and treatment of
9
the United States under international law." Concurrently,
the ICC could influence American foreign policy in terms of
157. See Brown, supra note 3, at 891.
158. See Scheffer, supra note 44 (regarding the economic support given the
ICTY and ICTR).
159. See ICC Hearings,supra note 7 (in reference to Scheffer's remarks about
the future for the United States in international law).
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humanitarian and peacekeeping activities as well as its
foreign relations with other states.1 6 ° Last, and perhaps most
importantly, the United States's decision will speak volumes
about the overall legitimacy of international law and its
ability to enforce individual obligations to respect human
rights.'6'
A.

Legal Claims
1. The Definition of Aggression

The current definition of aggression does not significantly
threaten American interests. Although the United States
may disagree with the inclusion of the crime in the statute,
its practical negative potential is mitigated because any
definition must comport with the terms of the United Nations
Charter.16 Since the Charter gives the Security Council the
right to determine the act of aggression, the Council
ultimately decides whether to prosecute under the crime.'63
Since the United States has a permanent member status
on the Council, it should not fear the amendment process.
Instead, it should seek clarification surrounding the ability of
states to remove themselves from the jurisdiction of the crime
once the body passes an amendment. "4 The United States
would like the same option if it does not ratify the statute by
the time signatory states vote upon a definition of aggression.
2. The Power of the Prosecutor
The United States feared that its leaders or soldiers
could be subject to baseless attacks by either a prosecutor
with a political agenda or by an enemy state which could
manipulate the court. 66
However, because negotiators
included so many safeguards to placate the American
delegation, this is an unlikely scenario. 6 6 Strict definitions
within the statute itself constitute the first line of defense by
160. See id.
161. See David, supra note 38, at 408 (considering the negative implications
of the recent U.S. decisions).
162. See Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court: Some Questions
and Answers (Oct. 1998) <http://un.org/law/icc/statute/iccq&a.htm>.
163. See id.
164. See Brown, supra note 3, at 867-68.
165. See O'Connor, supra note 2, at 954-55.
166. See Brown, supra note 3, at 880.
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dictating that the Court will prosecute only the most serious
167
of international crimes.
Second, and most important, complementarity will
protect the United States because the statute affords a state
adequate notice before the prosecutor investigates any of its
citizens."' Thus, the state can eliminate the prosecutor's
9
involvement by conducting its own investigations.
Third, the prosecutor must pass extensive judicial tests
in order to truly begin prosecution of an individual. This
includes convincing a judicial oversight panel, whose consent
0 If the panel agrees,
is crucial to beginning an investigation.
the prosecutor must then gather evidence and convince a
second panel that sufficient grounds exist for prosecution and
jurisdiction.17 ' Then, if officials bring a suspect into custody,
the prosecutor must pass judicial scrutiny a third time and
1 72
convince a panel that the prosecution is substantiated.
The power of the Security Council to delay any
proceedings for at least a year presents the fourth safeguard
against a rogue prosecutor."' Although the motion must pass
by a majority vote of the entire fifteen member Council,74 it
seems fairly certain that the United States could use its
7
influence to table any investigation with which it disagreed. '
3. Jurisdictionover Non-Party States
Although the United States might have practical
concerns over the ability of the Court to prosecute its
nationals if it abstains from or delays ratification, it offers
tenuous legal arguments at best.' First, the United States is
mistaken in its assertion that the statute would bind non77 The Court
party states in violation of international law.'
78
does not claim jurisdiction over states, but individuals,'
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id. at 881.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 880.
172. See Brown, supra note 3, at 880.
173. See O'Connor, supra note 2, at 966.
174. See id. (commenting on the pivotal power of the Security Council).
175. See id. at 967.
176. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Politics by Other Means, The Law of the
InternationalCriminalCourt, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 489 (1999).
177. See id. at 491.
178. See id.
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abiding expressly by the precedents the United States
supported at Nuremberg.'79
The statute would impose
obligations upon parties such as payment of dues, the
procurement of pertinent evidence, and extradition of an
accused individual. 8 ' These conditions would not, however,
apply to non-party states.'81
While the Court may prosecute U.S. nationals even if it
withholds ratification, this does not represent a great
departure from the manner in which international crimes are
currently handled.'8 2 The international community considers
the crimes over which the Court has subject-matter
jurisdiction as grave breaches of international law,
legitimizing prosecution under the jurisdiction of any
interested state.'
The only difference is that the ICC, as
opposed to state courts, will try the individual. Because the
Court applies strict due process standards (for which the
United States itself lobbied), individuals will enjoy enhanced
due process rights and may receive greater protection than in
many state jurisdictions.'84
The demand by the United States to link the jurisdiction
of the Court only to instances where the concerned state was
a party to the statute would prove far too limiting.'88 In this
case, any state that foresaw itself committing war crimes
could escape liability by simply withholding its acceptance of
the statute.' 86 This scenario would unacceptably cripple the
Court, especially as negotiators already limited its
jurisdiction as a concession to appease the American
delegation."'
B.

PoliticalClaims Based on Sovereignty
The apparent desire to have an unconditional veto over
the International Criminal Court raises serious questions
about the agenda of the United States at Rome as well as its
commitment to the most basic principles of international
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

See King & Theofrastous, supra note 15, at 82.
See Orentlicher, supra note 176, at 491.
See id.
See Roth, supra note 4.
See id.
See discussion supra Part II.D.
See Roth, supra note 4.
See id.
See id.
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humanitarian law.188 Although the United States clearly has
the right to care for its own interests at home and abroad, its
attempt at absolute sovereignty is flawed in theory and
practice.
A time existed when every state was accountable only to
itself, but in an increasingly globalized and interdependent
world, that time has long since passed. 9 Repeatedly over the
past fifty years, the United States has espoused the virtues of
international law, from its role in the criminal tribunals of
Nuremberg, Yugoslavia, and Rwanda, 9 ' to its participation in
the various United Nations conventions defining the
substance of the law that fuels the ICC statute.9 In the
wake of the Rome Conference, it appears as if the United
States favors international justice, as long as it enjoys
exemption from its reach.'9
This approach seems so out of step with contemporary
practice that one must wonder whether the United States
suffers from poor diplomatic coordination rather than flawed
foreign policy. For example, the United States recently
accepted the jurisdiction of the Yugoslav Tribunal over
alleged crimes committed by a soldier involved with its
clear contradiction to its
peacekeeping operations' 93-a
94
demand for reassurances of immunity from the ICC.' The
solution to this policy conundrum remains unclear, and
although the United States made a strong symbolic statement
by signing the statute, its continued legal objections hold
little validity in the international community.
V. PROPOSAL
The United States has attempted to frame its opposition
to the International Criminal Court in legalistic terms, but
once examined, these objections appear unsubstantiated. The
concerns expressed by the American delegation at Rome with
9
regards to jurisdiction of non-parties lack merit. '
Additionally, the fears of politically-based claims seem
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

See David, supra note 38, at 408
See A World Court for Criminals,supra note 134.
See supra text accompanying notes 34, 37.
See Brown, supra note 3, at 855.
See Burden of Proof,supra note 41.
See id.
See id.
See Orentlicher, supra note 176, at 491.
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exaggerated when compared to the force of the
complementarity principle, the additional safeguards afforded
by the procedure of the Court, and the special power given to
the Security Council.
These concessions and any future substantive changes
which may occur while the statutory refining process
continues will only go so far towards placating state leaders.
Before the United States takes any formal action, whether
supportive or in opposition to the Court, it must resolve the
internal conflict existing between the popular conception of
sovereignty and the increasingly important role the country
plays in the globalized world. This conflict is not inherent, as
some political leaders have suggested,'96 but due largely to the
widely-held belief that sovereignty is an exclusionary device
which protects states from alien influences.197 However, even
as the international community breaks into an increasing
number of separate state actors,'9 8 exclusionary and
isolationist barriers continue to weaken, rather than prosper.
This process of increased interdependence suggests not the
demise of national sovereignty, but instead, that the concept
can function in more than one manner. If sovereignty allows
a state to protect itself from international and supra-national
forces, then conversely, sovereignty also gives a state the
right to participate in such forces.199 In this sense, the
principle of sovereignty contributes to, rather than detracts
from, the international system. Understanding sovereignty
as being more than a defensive mechanism will go a long way
towards shifting the discussion surrounding the Court away
from political posturing, and towards a meaningful debate
which better addresses practical concerns and national
interests.
Although the United States may still find that its
interests outweigh that of an international court, its
justification for such a finding will not stem from modern
international law. In light of the weakness of its substantive
arguments, there seems little to proffer in remaining a
196. See supra notes 151-153 and accompanying text.
197. See Brian Havel, The Constitution in an Era of Supranational
Adjudication, 78 N.C. L. REV. 257, 327 (2000).
198. See id. ("The reported demise of the nation-state, for example, has not
occurred. On the contrary, the global club of sovereigns has almost doubled
since the founding of the United Nations.").
199. See id. at 328.
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renegade from the Court. 2 ' The United States should become

actively involved with all further proceedings related to the
Participation will not
International Criminal Court.
guarantee ratification, but it will allow the United States to
concerns from a position of strength rather than
address its
21
impunity.
While working to refine the structure of the Court to
better address its concerns, the United States should
subsequently begin a dialogue in an attempt to answer
lingering questions concerning the constitutionality of the
Court and its potential relationship to domestic law. Absent
a rigorous discussion to reveal the complexities of these legal
issues, any ratification procedure would be woefully
inadequate.
VI. CONCLUSION

As the second century of international law begins, the
global community stands at a unique position in human
For the first time, a truly supra-national
history.
organization to maintain peace and security will exist that
reflects vital legal and customary beliefs over which virtually
all nations agree. It is only fitting that the most powerful
nation in the world takes a primary role in creating a court
that can accomplish its objectives with fairness and
effectiveness. Although the Court is not perfect, the United
States should recognize that existing problems serve as a
justification for participation, rather than as bases for
rejection.

200. See King & Theofrastous, supra note 15, at 104-05.
201. See id.

